Abstract The social Web is going mobile and needs support for friendship management in a distributed manner, while privacy concerns mandate conguring the public visibility of one's friends. In this paper we leverage existing Web standards to describe a simple P2P protocol for establishing, enforcing, and revoking hidden friendship relations and report on an implementation for a mobile platform. We examine the suitability of hidden friendship links for bilateral and delegated access control and discuss how the social connotation of friendship can be preserved when concealing the friend's identity.
Online Friendship Relations and Privacy
The use of on-line and social networking websites is growing, and social interaction through such systems is now part of the daily routine for many individuals [4] . Whilst the development of social networking on the Internet originated from the desire to allow individuals to update their friends or colleagues with new personal or professional information, social networking techniques are now being used to enhance the performance of many other Internet services. For example, friendship links have improved Internet search content indexing and ranking by using HTTP requests made by friends [9] ; Tribler [11] is an overlay on top of BitTorrent [10] , allowing users to establish friendship links and form groups in order to increase download speed or improve content discovery.
Positive privacy of friendship relations. Once established, the friendship relation often confers additional rights or capabilities to friends, such as the ability to view personal photographs or send private messages (rst use-case, UC1). In this context, friendship links on social networks are seen as privacy enhancing, since they restrict access to personal information. Unfortunately, the controls available to limit access to personal data or enhanced services are often quite primitive.
Most sites allow users to restrict access to personal information to friends (of rst or higher degree) and some sites permit permission to be congured at an individual level. There are only few sites which allow users to privately group individuals together and apply access control at the group level directly; such capabilities are required to provide more generic rôle-based access control facilities.
As online social networking sites increasingly become platforms on which relationships are setup rather than merely replicated from the oine world, networks provide trust metrics to guide the users in assessing other members' credibility. Despite its limitations, a user's friends count is used as a simple yet intuitive metric in contexts such as casual dating, business contacts, or electronic commerce (UC2).
Friendship links may also be used by the information consumer for incoming ltering rather than for outgoing ltering by the information producer. The access control function of friendship is replaced by an information overow prevention function. For instance, user agents may only process broadcasted events such as status updates that originate from known friends; Sunday shoppers may only enjoy receiving promotional oers from stores that are on their favourites list (UC3).
The gate-keeping function of friendship relations is not restricted to pairwise encounters, but can be extended to multihop authorisation based on functional properties of the links, including but not limited to transitivity: friends of friends or, more generally, friends of n th degree may enjoy privileged access (UC4).
Active consent of the original information holder or of the involved middlemen may be required for successful privilege propagation (UC5).
Negative privacy of friendship relations. The set of attributes and identities linked with a friend's online prole introduce a privacy-endangering facet into friendship relations. Having a friendship relation with somebody may be socially detrimental. For example, investigating journalists have a professional interest in keeping their sources secret (UC6). Executive professionals may wish to maintain secret ties with friends working at competitor companies (UC7). And teenagers may feel peer group pressure in choosing who they call friends (UC8).
Pitfalls also arise within the online network itself when the number and kind of friends positively and negatively inuence one's social status (UC9). There are also potential negative consequences outside the social realm. Companies rely on the formalised nature of friendship relations to mine connections between users along which personality traits and socio-economic characteristics are assumed to propagate. A potential employer may refuse a candidate because of her friendship with others; and users may receive targeted advertisements based on preferences and interests their friends publicised on the network site.
The nature of the friendship relation on social networking sites therefore requires the ability to hide friendship relations. Simply hiding all of one's friends does not solve the problem, because it denies the advantages of public friendship and ignores the symmetry of friendship relations, implying that either of the involved parties may reveal the existence of a link independently. In analysing an existing social network, the authors found that more than two thirds of users who chose to conceal friendships actually had exposed at least one of these supposedly hidden relationships [12] .
Mobile networking. As the performance and capability of mobile phones increases, such devices increasingly host social networking applications. This movement provides richer (yet intermittent) connectivity, encourages greater levels of data entry, and allows the automated collection of sensor data, such as location information. Intermittent connectivity encourages more application state and functionality to reside on the device itself, rather than a remote server, and it is for this reason we believe that a move to decentralised social networks will occur. In the long term, mobile devices may function without any centralised facilities at all. Brief encounters amongst humans will trigger ad-hoc connectivity between devices. For instance, human mobility and opportunistic short-range networking may allow social networks to be built on top of delaytolerant networks, for which, in turn, stable human connectivity traces suggest reliable routing paths [6, 16] . Also, a decentralised scheme potentially provides better privacy guarantees, since trusting social network operators is no longer a prerequisitedata are kept on the device under the control of the individual.
Our contribution. The contribution of this paper is twofold. Building on previous research into the architecture of hidden friendship relations [12] , we propose a simple protocol for establishing, enforcing, and revoking selectively hidden friendship relations in a P2P scenario. In addition, we describe an implementation of this protocol for mobile devices, providing details of the user interface and on the integration with the phone's existing messaging and contact management facilities. We review our protocol with regard to security and functional requirements, to resource consumption, as well as to standard compliance. Based on nine use-cases, we examine the suitability of hidden friendship links to convey privileges and we discuss how the social connotation of friendship can be preserved when concealing the friend's identity.
Hidden Friendship Relations Protocol
Deployment scenario and protocol requirements. In a centralised scenario, hidden friendship links can easily be implemented by the central network server removing hidden friends from its response when serving a user's list of friends, based on the credentials the requesting client presents. In particular, the network operator is in a position to evaluate any credentials with regard to a strong identity since the user is typically session-authenticated. In an otherwise secure system, it is unlikely that user B could pose for A when presenting (replaying) one of A's credentials.
In a distributed scenario, however, checking the credentials of the requesting user represents a server-like task, implying that continuous connectivity must be maintained, which is incompatible with the assumption of intermittent connectivity and prohibitively resource-consuming for mobile devices.
One of the design challenges, which occurs when removing a central authority, becomes the lack of a strong yet simple proof of identity. A traditional decentralised public key infrastructure, such as GPG, or the web of trust imply a social graph in which identity can be mined to the detriment of hidden friendship.
Design goals and requirements. In order to support a distributed social network, it is desirable if a user's list of friends is immutable with respect to requests being made by dierent parties. A distributed hidden friendship protocol is further expected to full the following design goals: (a) users should be able to selectively hide a self-chosen subset of their friends; (b) a friendship relation, whether hidden or public is symmetric; (c) users should be able to establish, to revoke, and to set the visibility of their outgoing friendship links uni-laterally, i.e. without coordination eorts; (d) a friendship is public i both friends make it public and it is hidden i both friends hide it; (e) a friend B of user A can check whether their friendship still holds by inspecting A's list of friends; (f ) everybody should see public friendship links, and nobody except the involved parties should be able to infer a hidden friendship from either list of friends; (g) the establishment of a friendship relation requires the consent of both parties; (h) hidden and public friendship links are both made public, i.e. hiding a friendship link comes not from concealing its existence (no security through obscurity).
It is outside the scope of the protocol to specify what leads to establishing a friendship. This preceding interaction pertains to the social sphere.
Threat model. We outline the security goals and the threat model for a hidden friendship in general and its distributed deployment in particular. The fundamental notion is user A calling user B a hidden friend. This shall be manifested with an encrypted entry E AB in A's public list of friends. The entry can be accessed by any other user since the list of friends is public. However, it shall not be possible for a non-related third-party X / ∈ {A,B} to learn who B is from the entry in the list of friends. In particular, X is unable to locate the corresponding list of friends in which E BA should be listed in case the hidden friendship actually exists through symmetrically calling one another a hidden friend.
The following assumptions are made with regard to a friend entry E AB : (a) E AB = E BA so that the symmetry of a hidden friendship is not obvious; (b) E BA = E CA so that two users having a common friend is not visible in the friend list;
(c) a friends list entry corresponding to a hidden friendship can be told apart from a non-hidden friendship link; (d) the validity of E AB cannot be established by X, i.e. X cannot distinguish a real friends list entry from random data made up by A. It is assumed to be beyond the capabilities of an attacker to compute E BA from E AB and to infer B from E AB .
Regarding the integrity of a list of friends, we assume that a user has sole control over her public list of friends and that requests to this list can be made in a secure manner. A potential attacker has the following capabilities: (a) monitoring trac of users; (b) monitoring changes in the published lists of friends;
(c) re-publishing hidden or public friendship entries found in other users' lists of friends.
Regarding the system environment, the following assumptions are made: (a) Still, the countability goal is not be achievable by withdrawing the assumption (d) only. Any user may have several identities that she could use for establishing friendship links between seemingly dierent users. There are therefore at least two techniques to boost one's hidden friends count, each of which cannot be precluded in a fully distributed scenario where identities can be created opaquely at low cost. We conclude that X can only learn a lower bound for A's number of hidden friends from latter list of friends. The satisability of weakened countability goals is discussed in Section 2, p. 9.
Social networks also rely on friendship as an access control criterion as described in use-cases UC1 and UC4. The existence of a friendship relation is enforced when accessing a secured resource. We distinguish between two cases: rst, direct enforcement and, second, delegated enforcement. Bilateral enforcement relies on the design goals and is achieved since both parties involved in a hidden friendship can verify its continued existence in their own and the respectively other's records. A third party tests the existence of a friendship between two users by pairwise associating a friendship claim with a proof of identity.
Granting access to privileged resources may not be limited to one's direct friends but also friends of friends or, more generally, friends of n th degree. We discuss the compatibility of hidden friendship links with multihop friendship in Section 2, p. 9.
Leveraging existing technologies. The implementation of a hidden friendship protocol, discussed in the next Section on p. 6, can be built on top of existing Internet and security technologies, keeping the protocol itself concise while leveraging established and developing standards. In particular, the following infrastructure for publishing personal information in a semantic format and for transmitting information in a secure and concealed manner is used as a basis: (a) the vCard format extension to represent social network membership information for a single individual, in particular the publisher of the vCard le [5] ; (b) the representation of latter in semantic HTML using hCard for direct embedding into personal or other Web pages, including distributed social network prole pages [1] ; (c) the FOAF (friend-of-a-friend) standard to encode personal information and relationships in a machine-readable format; (d) FOAF+SSL, as an alternative to
OpenId to allow for certicate-bound identities and distributed authentication across multiple social networks [15] ; (e) a contact list private to the user's individual, such as a phone book, Outlook contacts or a private FOAF le; (f ) means for encrypting messages and for concealing messaging interaction, using remailers such as Mixminion [3] .
Implementation: establishing friendships. associated with a user is public, the individual contact list (database) is private.
For a public friendship, the friends store the respectively other's public identier in their own list of friends: A stores K P and P stores K A . For a hidden friendship, the friends store a public key issued by the respectively other for this friendship relation only. A generates a key-pair (K i , K −1 i ): she keeps the private part and sends the public part to B who incorporates it into her public list of friends.
B also generates a key-pair (K j , K foaf:nickname or other RDF vocabulary may be used instead of foaf:name or rdf:resource may also be used to qualify the nature of the referencing identier rather than of the reference itself.
For the friendship relations depicted in Figure 1 The rôle of a central authority / delegated access control with distributed hidden friendships. As outlined in use-case UC1, friendship links form the basis for social access control schemes. In particular, a user may publish a digital resource such as the photographs from the wedding or a video from the last rafting trip.
Only friends shall have access to this resource. Typically, A does not want to host this material herself but relies on dedicated service providers to full this server-like task since these oer continuous connectivity and have sucient bandwith and storage resources. Several social networks have grown around such media publishing. The idea of centralised content storage is compatible with and complementary to decentralised friendship control. Figure 3 depicts a scenario where A publishes a restricted document using C's services and B, a hidden friend of A, wants to access the document. C shall be able to check whether B qualies for access without having A to reveal her friends to C. Delegated access control is a major motivation for uniformly publishing hidden and non-hidden friends.
Access to a secured resource will be determined based on a list of friends which is referenced through a Uri as part of the upload process. Linking to the friends list instead of physically uploading it implies that changes in A's list of friends will be reected in C's decisions who shall have access with no need for A to alter the uploaded content/ACL bundle. A may want to specify a resource-dependent caching policy which allows C to base its decisions on local copies of A's list of friends. Setting such caching policies is perfectly feasible when requests to the Uri of A's FOAF le are served over HTTP(S).
As soon as friendship enforcement relies on a cached list of friends relayed by third parties, the authenticity of the caches needs to be suciently reliable.
Signing FOAF les guarantees their integrity and can be done using standard XML Signature procedures. To ensure that the signer actually is the original publisher (and not an attacker), the signature key needs to be linked suciently strongly with the FOAF le author. Semi-centralised architectures such as institutional trust provide strong evidence as can a web of trust provided there are enough public friendship links. Note that once established, the belief in a signature key can be passed on over updates of the signed document.
A public friend is trivially granted access since anybody can enforce a public friendship relationship. A hidden friend can prove her entitlement without revealing her identity: access shall be granted to a requestor who can prove to have the private key associated with any public key located in the uploaders public FOAF le. This challenge-response can be done using standard procedures. It is not important under which hidden friends' public key a requestor authenticates since all hidden friends have access anyway. A leaked private friendship key is just the digital analogy to an unreliable friend.
Counting hidden friendships. As outlined in use-cases UC2 and UC9 counting one's friends is another typical social networking application. Given a user's list of friends, one can only tell how many hidden friends this user has at most (see p. 5). However, in the context of an access control scenario as the one outlined above, the content distributor C could publish statistics on how many successful authentications against dierent public friendship keys were made (still being unable to tell how many distinct users authenticated). A user may use a similar infrastructure to propose a vote of condence and ask her friends to support her without unveiling their identity.
Hidden friendship of n th degree. As outlined in use-case UC4, privilege propagation beyond direct friendship links may be desirable. Users can identify public 
